Patricia Maughan Jeppson v. Saylor Jeppson : Appellant\u27s Brief by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1966
Patricia Maughan Jeppson v. Saylor Jeppson :
Appellant's Brief
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.W. Eugene Hansen; Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Jeppson v. Jeppson, No. 10452 (1966).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3707
IN THE SUPREME COURT --.:. 
of the "IJNIVERSITY OF UT AH 









0.fendant and Resp<mdent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
A»leal from the Judgment 'df the 
District Court of Davis County 
ll<lali>le Thornley K. Swan, District Judge 
W. Eugene Hansen 
NIELSEN, CONDER AND 
HANSEN 
510 ·Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
At~/or 
P1aintiff and Appell,ant 
lexJ. Hanson F I L E D ~SON AND .B~DWIN 
Salt I:1ci~~~:t NOV 1 9 1965 
A~ and ReBp&nden,1 ·-·cJ;:1: s;;;;;,;;;·c;;;;,,-u;;i;-
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
NATURE OF THE CASE . ·-------·----·-·-----··----------·---- 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ----·-·--·----·-·---····---- 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ···--··-·-·--··-·-·--······-·--- 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ----------·--··-·--------- ___________ 2 
ARGUMENT -------·---------------·--·---·---------···--··--···------------------- 6 
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING 
THERE HAD BEEN A CHANGE OF CIRCUM-
STANCES DURING THE PERIOD AUGUST 4, 
1964, TO JUNE 3, 1965, SUFFICIENT TO JUS-
TIFY A MODIFICATION OF THE CHILD CUS-
TODY PORTION OF THE DECREE. ------------· ____ 6 
POINT II. THE MODIFICATION WAS NOT IN THE 
BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN OF THE 
PARTIES. ----------------------·-····------------------··------------------ 12 
CONCLUSION ·------------------------·-----------------------·--··-------------- 19 
AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Carson v. Carson, 87 U. 1, 47 P.2d 894 ____________________________ 7 
Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63 U. 261, 225 P.2d 76 ··----------·--- 17 
Cody v. Cody, 47 U. 456, 154 P. 952 -·--- __ ·-·-----·--·------- 8 
Gale v. Gale, 123 U. 277, 258 P.2d 986 ---------------· ________ 7 
Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 17 U. 2d ____ , 406 P.2d 304 ________ 7 
Motzkus v. Motzkus, 17 U. 2d ____ , 406 P.2d 31 ____________ 12 
Smith v. Smith, 1 U.2d 75, 262 P.2cl 283 -----·-------------- 8 
STATUTE 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 30-3-5 ________________ 6 
TEXT 
Keezer on Marriage and Divorce, 3rd Ed., pp. 776 ____ 7 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA MAUGHAN 
JEPPSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SAYLOR JEPPSON, 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This Appeal involves the question of change 
of custody and visitation rights with respect to the 
minor children of the divorced parties. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff's Petition to Modify the Divorce De-
cree was tried to the Court. From a Judgment Modi-
fying the Decree in accordance with Defendant's 
Petition, Plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks to have the Modification of the 
Divorce Decree entered July 27, 1965, set aside, 
with the exception of the provision for attorney's 
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fees and the restraining order contained in said 
Decree and the Decree entered the 21st day of 
August, 1964, reinstated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties to this Appeal were divorced by 
Decree entered February 21, 1962. (R. 19) Plain-
tiff was awarded a Decree of Divorce against De-
fendant on the grounds of mental cruelty. (R. 14) 
The Decree of Divorce further awarded the care, 
custody and control of the three minor children of 
the parties, who were then ages seven, six and two, 
to the Plaintiff. (R. 17, 18) Defendant remarried 
June 20, 1963, and presently resides in Bountiful, 
Utah. (R. 2) Plaintiff remarried June 22, 1963, 
and presently resides in La Habra, California. (R. 
43) All of the children resided with Plaintiff until 
July, 1963, when the eldest of said children, Gary 
Maughan Jeppson, then age nine, went to live with 
Defendant pursuant to an agreement between the 
parties. (R. 37, 38) There was a dispute between 
the parties as to how long the eldest child was to 
remain with Defendant. ( R. 33) 
On June 26, 1964, Defendant filed a ~etition 
with the District Court to Modify the Divorce De-
cree entered prior; Defendant asked that custody 
of Gary be awarded to him and that he have 30 
days visitation with the two younger children in 
Utah each year. Defendant alleged a material 
change of circumstances; that he had remarried 
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and that Gary had lived in their home for a year 
and was well adjusted and had also attained the 
age of ten years. With respect to the younger child-
ren Defendant alleged he was unable to adequately 
visit with them because of travel expenses and the 
time factor. (R. 25, 27) 
Plaintiff thereafter filed a Motion to Quash 
the Order to Show Cause which had been issued in 
connection with the Petition to Modify, or in the 
alternative, to stay the proceedings, alleging that 
Defendant had refused to return the eldest child of 
the pa1·ties to her in accordance with his agreement 
with her. ( R. 29, 30) 
A hearing was held on Defendant's Petition 
before the Honorable Charles G. Cowley on July 28, 
1964, and August 4, 1964, at which time the Court 
intcniewed the eldest child, Gary. ( R. 43, 44) 
On August 21, 1964, the Court entered its 
Findings that there had been a change of circum-
stances since the entry of the Divorce Decree, that 
the Defendant had remarried and had established 
a home where the eldest child, Gary, had lived for 
a year and had been happy and had become emo-
tionally stabilized and had a good relationship with 
Defendant's new wife; that Gary had reached the 
age of ten years and expressed to the Court his 
desire to live with the Defendant; that Plaintiff 
had refused to let Defendant visit with the other 
two children of the parties except in the confines 
of her own home. ( R. 37-39) 
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Based on these Findings, the Court entered a 
Decree on the 21st day of August, 1964, changing 
the custody of the eldest child, Gary, to Defendant 
except for the period July 1 to August 15 of each 
year when Plaintiff would have temporary custody 
in her home. The Decree further provided that De-
fendant be permitted to visit the two younger child-
ren in California only at such times as he wished 
to make the trip; that he could take the children 
from Plaintiff's home during daylight hours but 
could not keep them over night. (R. 40-41) 
Shortly over nine months after the entry of 
Judge Cowley's Decree Defendant swore to anothe1· 
Petition to "Modify Divorce and Custody Decree" 
on June 3, 1965, alleging a change of circumstances 
regarding the eldest child, Gary, and the other two 
children of the parties, 
"In that the said child absolutely refuses to 
make the contemplated visit to Plaintiff as 
required by said Decree and threatened to 
'run away' if forced to visit with Plaintiff 
in Whittier, California; he has made the Little 
League baseball team and is very active in 
the Cub Scout program and Defendant has 
been advised by Gary's school counselor that 
Gary has an emotional antagonism toward 
the Plaintiff and that it would be aggravated 
if Gary is required to visit the Plaintiff dur-
ing the six-week period contemplated by the 
Decree." (R. 48) 
The same Petition also alleged a change of cir-
cumstances with regard to Defendant's visitation 
of the two younger children stating . 
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"That he was unable to leave his work suffi-
ciently to exercise his visitation rights; that 
prohibition of visitation only during daylight 
hours had effectively barred him from visita-
tion and that the Plaintiff had refused to give 
him her telephone number." (R. 48) 
Plaintiff answered Defendant's Petition deny-
mg a change of circumstances and alleged that De-
fendant was carrying 'Out a concerted plan to alien-
ate the children from her. ( R. 53-58) 
The matter came on for hearing on June 29 
and 30, 1965, before the Honorable Thornley K. 
Swan. 
On July 27, 1965, the Court entered its Find-
ings of Fact stating, 
"That since entry of the said Decree on Aug-
ust 24, 1964, there has been a change of cir-
cumstances regarding the minor child, Gary 
Maughan, in that said child absolutely refuses 
to make the contemplated visit to the Plain-
tiff as required by the said Decree and threat-
ened to 'run away' if forced to visit with the 
Plaintiff in her home in California; that his 
opposition to making said visits stems from 
the intense dislike that he has acquired for 
the Plaintiff's husband, Allyn Schroeder, fur-
ther that he has made the Little League base-
ball team which will not end its activities until 
August 1 and is very active in the Cub Scout 
program and Defendant has been advised by 
Gary's school counselor that because of Gary's 
emotional antagonism towards the Plaintiff's 
husband that a visit during the six-week peri-
od contemplated by the Decree would aggra-
vate said emotional problem." (R. 60-60A) 
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The Court further found 
"That since the Decree entered on August 
24 1964 there has been a change of circum-st~nces i~egarding Defendant's visiting rights 
with the minor children, Teri Lynn and J edcl 
Alan, in that Defendant is unable to leave 
his work sufficiently to exercise his visiting 
rights and that prohibition of the Decree that 
he be allowed to visit them only during the 
daylight hours in Plaintiff's home, has effec-
tively prohibited him from exercising his law-
ful rights of visitation and Plaintiff has re-
fused to divulge her telephone number to the 
Defendant which prevents him from even 
visiting the children via telephone." (R. 60A) 
A Modified Decree was entered on July 27, 
1965, granting Defendant temporary custody of the 
two younger children from August 6 to August 16 
and granting Plaintiff temporary custody of Gary 
from August 16 to August 30 and providing that 
the Decree will be reviewed again by the Court in 
May of 1966. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THERE 
HAD BEEN A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES DUR-
ING THE PERIOD AUGUST 4, 1964, TO JUNE 3, 1965, 
SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A MODIFICATION OF THE 
CHILD CUSTODY PORTION OF THE DECREE. 
Plaintiff readily admits that Section 30-3-5, 
U.C.A., 1953, authorizes the Court to make modi-
fications and new orders with respect to divorce de· 
crees. However, the law of this state has been firmly 
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established that a substantial change of circiim-
stances must be shown to justify a modification of 
a Decree or a new Order. 
In the case of Gale v. Gale, 123 U. 277, 258 
P.2d 986, This Court held after discussing a long 
line of cases on the question of change of circum-
stances: 
"A Divorce Decree may not be modified unless 
it is alleged, proved and the Trial Court finds 
that the circumstances upon which it was 
based have undergone a substantial change." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The case of Carson v. Carson, 87 U. 1, 47 P.2d 
894, held that a party to a divorce proceeding is not 
entitled to a modification of a Decree . . . 
"in absence of a showing that there has been 
material and permanent change of conditions 
since entry of the Decree." (Emphasis added.) 
In the very recent case of Jorgensen v. Jorgen-
sen, 17 U. 2d ______ , 406 P.2d 304, this Court again 
recites the need for a ~'substantial change". 
And in Keezer on Marriage and Divorce, 3rd 
Edition at pp. 766 is found the following: 
"The Petition for change 6f custody must be 
supported by strong evidence showing that the 
welfare of the child should be benefited by 
the change. The burden of proof on this issue 
is on the Petitioner." 
A request for modification, such as Defend-
ant's, which was presented to the Court within such 
a short period of time after the prior hearing should 
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be viewed with great scrutiny. Indeed, it would ap-
pear that the relief which Defendant requested in 
his Petition for Modification would have more pro-
perly been presented in a timely Appeal. As this 
Court held in Cody v. Cody, 47 U. 456, 154 P. 952 
at pp. 465: 
"Where a party is dissatisfied with the origin-
al allowance or distribution of property or the 
disposal of children, he must prosecute a time-
ly Appeal to review the Court's Orders or 
Decree in that regard." 
Since a child custody case is equitable in nature, 
the Court may review both the law and the facts. 
Smith v. Smith, 1 U.2d 75, 262 P.2d 283. 
A review of the Finding and the evidence in 
support of them fails to disclose a substantial change 
of circumstances. Paragraph seven of the Findings 
sets forth the changes relied upon by the Court with 
respect to Gary. They are as follows: 
1. Gary absolutely refuses to make the visit 
to California and threatens to run away because of 
his dislike for Plaintiff's husband; 
2. Gary is playing Little League ball which 
lasts until August 1. 
3. Gary is very active in Cub Scouts. 
4. Gary's school counselor has advised De-
fendant that Gary's emotional antagonism toward 
Plaintiff's husband will be aggravated if Gary visits 
his mother for six weeks. 
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With respect to item one, the Record is com-
pletely barren of any evidence other than Def end-
~nt's hearsay statements that Gary said he would 
not make the visit and that he would run away. 
But even if those statements were made they cer-
tainly should not be used as the basis for annuling 
the prior Judgment of the Court and substituting 
the demand of an eleven year old. It is urged by 
Plaintiff that if Defendant is unable to control or 
guide the actions of an eleven year old, after having 
complete custody for two years, with greater skill 
than he has displayed it might be best to relieve 
him of the responsibility of control altogether. 
With respect to the second item, Defendant 
testified on cross examination that Gary was not 
enrolled in Little League during the summer of 1964 
because he was visiting with his grandparents dur-
ing the enrollment period. (Tr. 18) Certainly 
a Court decreed visit with his natural mother to-
ward the end of the Little League season should be 
as important to the father of the child as an elec-
tive visit with grandparents which prevented the 
boy from participating in Little League at all the 
year prior. 
With respect to the third item, the Record in-
dicates that Gary was enrolled in Cub Scouts at the 
time of the first modification hearing ( R. 19), and 
there is nothing in the Record to indicate any change 
in this activity during the months prior to the 
second modification hearing. It should also be noted 
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that Plaintiff had made arrangements in California 
to have Gary carry on with his Cub Scout activities 
while he was there. (Tr. 48) 
With respect to the fourth item, the Record 
indicates that all Gary's school teacher testified to, 
(which was over Plaintiff's objection, Tr. 32-33) 
was the fact that a visit to California "might have 
an emotional effect". (Tr. 33) Under cross exam-
ination when asked if it was his opinion that it 
would be bad for Gary to visit with his mother for 
six weeks he stated he didn't know and went on 
to say 
~'It's something that would be entirely up to 
Gary on the thing. I don't know enough about 
his feelings toward his mother to know." (Tr. 
37) 
Now here in the Record does the school teacher testi-
fy that Gary has an emotional antagonism toward 
Plaintiff's husband as the Finding states. 
It is submitted that the Record fails to support 
the Findings and further that the Findings do not 
set forth substantial changes of circumstances suf-
ficient to justify annuling the six weeks summer 
custody period with the mother. of the child. 
Examining the second portio.n of the Findings 
and the evidence in support thereof, paragraph 
eight thereof sets forth the following changes of cir-
cumstances with respect to Defendant's visitation 
rights with the two younger children. 
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1. Defendant is unable to leave his work suf-
ficiently to exercise his visiting rights. 
2. The prohibition of the Decree that Defend-
ant be allowed to visit the children only during day-
light hours in Plaintiff's home has effectively pro-
hibited him from exercising his lawful rights of 
visitation and Plaintiff has refused to give De-
fendant her telephone number. 
With respect to the first item, Defendant was 
Eiaking $300.00 per year more at the time of the 
second hearing than the first (Tr. 14); his work 
schedules had not changed from the time of the 
first hearing to the second one (Tr. 16); he has 20 
working days' vacation each year ('Tr. 13) ; when 
he works the Sunday shift from midnight until 8 :00 
a.m. Monday he does not have to report to work 
until Thursday at 4 :00 p.m. (Tr. 17) It is also 
significant to note that in the year's period prior 
to the first modification hearing the Defendant 
only visited the children once in California. (Tr. 
16-17) 
·with respect to the second item of the Find-
ings, it should be noted that it is patently defective 
in that the Decree does not limit Defendant to visi-
tation within Plaintiff's home and in any event, 
there are absolutely no facts suggested in the Record 
to indicate that there has been a change of circum-
stances with respect to this item. 
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POINT II 
THE MODIFlCATION WAS NOT IN THE BEST 
INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN OF THE PARTIES. 
Certainly, the policy of the law with respect 
to child custody matters has been stated by the Court 
on numerous occasions. Most recently, in the case 
of Motzk~ v. Motzkus, 17 U.2d ______ , 406 P.2d 31, 
this Court stated as fallows: 
"But it should be kept in mind that a contest 
over the custody of a child is something more 
than an adversarial proceeding between the 
parties. More important than their rights is 
the welfare of the child which is always the 
paramount consideration, and which the 
Court, representing the interest of the pub-
lic, has a duty to safeguard." 
In this respect it is significant to note that no-
where does Defendant's Petition allege, nor did the 
Court find that it would be in the best interest of 
the children of the parties if the ear lier Modifica-
tion of the Decree be set aside and the later Modi-
fication be substituted. 
The Record is replete with evidence which in· 
dicates a bitter and vindictive father whose main 
concern appears to be to defeat the order of the 
Court and to alienate the children from their mother. 
Where else would this lad of tender years (age ten 
at the time of the first modification hearing) ac-
quire the feeling he expressed in chambers to the 
Judge at the first modification hearing. Quoting 
from that transcript commencing at pp. 71: 
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"Q. Now where do you think you would like 
to live? 
"A. Bountiful. 
"'Q. You think you would like to live in 
Bountiful? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Who with? 
"A. With my dad and mom. 
''Q. Is that your real mom or your step 
mom? 
"A. Cleo. Not my real mom. I don't want 
to live with her up in California because you 
know, she did something real bad, you know, 
bad. I want to live with my dad. 
"Q. Why? 
"A. Well, because what Pat - what she did 
with Allyn was bad. 
"Q. Who do you call 'Pat?' 
"A. Mom. My regular mom. 
"Q. You call her 'Pat?' Is that her nickname? 
"A. Yes. It's 'Pat'. And when she went out 
on dates with Allyn, Dad, he tried to make her 
stop this but she wouldn't stop." 
There is nothing in the Record to suggest the 
truthfulness of any of these statements which were 
in the mind of this ten year old boy. He was seven 
years of age when the Divorce Complaint was filed. 
(R. 10) 
Plaintiff in her testimony indicated the prob-
lems which she had with the two younger children 
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after they had visited with the Defendant in Calif-
ornia. Quoting from the Transcript at page 50. 
"Q. Now with respect to your observations 
that the children have been distressed, will you 
tell us what you have seen as the children 
have come back from various contacts or visits 
with Mr. Jeppson? Will you state also where 
you have observed these things? 
"A. When Mr. Jeppson visited the children 
in September (1964) Teri Lynn and Jedd 
were both very disappointed when they heard 
from Gary that he wasn't coming to Calif-
ornia this summer. And they stated that Say-
lor had heard Gary state this fact, and had 
reiterated by saying, 'Yes, Teri Lynn and Jedd 
if you want to see Gary you have to come to 
Utah.' 
"And further when I was speaking with Teri 
later, she was very concerned about the fact 
that the family was split. She said to me, 
'You know, Mother, Gary's awfully far away 
from us, 700 miles." " 
It would seem apparent that Defendant had no in-
tention of complying with the Decree less than a 
month after it was entered and was at that time 
deviously working on the minds· of the two younger 
children. 
Defendant's performance also left much to be 
desired with respect to his preparation of Gary to 
take the trip to California as illustrated by his re-
marks on direct examination wherein he testified 
as to his conversation with Gary the day after the 
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DH:ree was filed. Quoting from page 5 of the Tran-
script: 
"Q. Now since the hearing in the matter, 
this matter, the former hearing in July of 
1964 has Gary expressed or demonstrated to 
you ~ny antagonism or objection to spending 
six weeks with his mother and step father 
in California? 
". . . Q. Confine this to the time since the 
Decree and since the hearing of last year -
which I think was on July 28th, wasn't it, Mr. 
Hansen? 
" ... A. I believe it's the day after that, the 
Decree was filed. 
"Q. Tell the Court what happened, and how 
it came about. 
"A. vVell , we instructed Gary that he would 
be required to go to California the next sum-
mer beginning the first of July, for six weeks. 
And he began crying. He said he didn't want 
to go. 
"We told hini that he must go; not to argue 
aboid it. 
"He said - then he said, not to myself but 
to my wife, that if he had to go, that he'd 
ask to stop at a service station or a rest room, 
as soon as he could, then run away. 
On cross examination Defendant was asked what 
he did to prepare Gary to make the visit to Calif-
ornia. Quoting from page 19 of the Transcript: 
"Q. Now, what did you do to attempt to pre-
pare Gary to take this six-months' visitation 
in California? 
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"A. I told him he had to go. 
"Q. Was that all you said? 
"A. Well, I told him that if - I told him 
that I would speak to my attorney again, and 
he should plan on going. 
"Q. That you'd speak to your attorney to see 
if he had to go? 
"A. No. 
"Q. Oh. 
"A. I just told him that I would - he asked 
me if there wasn't anything I could do to keep 
him from having to spend all this summer 
down there, and have to go back and live with 
somebody that he didn't want to be around. 
And I told him I would do all that I could, 
if he really felt that way. 
"Q. And that's what you have done, is do 
all you could to see that he didn't have to go? 
"A. I don't know about that. 
It is submitted that Defendant's entire course 
of conduct with respect to Gary's visitation and with 
respect to a parent's responsibility to help engender 
love and respect for each other. left much to be de-
sired. It would further seem that Defendant. was 
not attempting to promote good will between the 
children and their mother nor was he concerned 
with the best interest of the children. It would 
seem that if the responses from the Defendant and 
the children are indicative of what Defendant's best 
efforts to comply with the Decree of the Court were 
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then it becomes obvious why a child might build 
up a resistance. It would further seem obvious that 
the court at the first modification hearing acted with 
great wisdom in requiring the Defendant to visit 
the two younger children only in the State of Calif-
ornia and during daylight hours. The wisdom of 
the six weeks visitation period during the summer 
is further apparent in that it would provide the 
mother an opportunity to build natural ties between 
herself and child which may have been damaged as 
the result of the devious practices which the boy 
had been exposed to. 
The conduct of Defendant during the entire 
time tends to raise a question of his good faith and 
sincerity as to the best interests of the children. 
Plaintiff is prompted to quote from the earlier Utah 
case of Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63 U. 261, 225 P. 76 at 
page 271, wherein the Court says: 
"To say the least, there appears to be a thread 
of disingenuousness on the part of Defendant 
running through the entire proceeding. The 
application for modification of the property 
features of the Decree, without any substan-
tial grounds therefor, interposed so soon after 
the Decree was entered, tends to engender a 
doubt as to the real purpose of Defendant in 
authorizing the Court to determine the pro-
perty rights of the parties as was done in the 
Decree. If his purpose was to get rid of his 
wife and child by final Decree, with the men-
tal reservation that as soon as this was ac-
c.omplish~d he would apply for an Order re-
heVIng him of that part of the Decree which 
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was burdensome to him, he could not hav~ 
expressed it much more clearly than he has 
clone by his conduct since the Decree became 
final." 
Comparing the instant case to the language in 
the Chaffee case, Defendant obtained the custody 
of the eldest child, Gary, for a school year through 
agreement; and when Plaintiff attempted to have 
the child i·eturned, Defendant filed his Petition for 
Modification of the Decree to obtain custody of the 
child alleging that Gary had become emotionally 
stabilized and was happy with Defendant and did 
not want to return to Plaintiff. The Decree was 
modified granting Defendant his desire. Yet, when 
it came time some 91/2 months later to perform and 
send Gary to California for the six weeks period 
with his mother, he filed another Petition for Modi-
fication, this time alleging that the boy had de-
veloped an "emotional antagonism", notwithstand-
ing the fact that he had been in the exclusive care 
of the Defendant. 
It is submitted that if Defendant had in mind 
Dbtaining custody of Gary with the mental reserva-
tion that by the time the summer visitation period 
came around he would have another plan to keep 
the boy from going and in fact a plan to bring the 
two younger children to him in Utah, he couldn't 





In conclusion, Plaintiff urges that the eYidence 
cloes not support the Findings and that there had 
not been a substantial change of circumstances at 
the time the lower Court granted the modification. 
Plaintiff further urges that there is ample 
evidence that the Modification was not in the best 
interest of the children. 
The portions of the Decree entered July 27, 
1965, that pertain to custody and visitation should 
0t: set aside and the Decree of August 21, 1964, re-
instated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
W. Eugene Hansen 
NIELSEN, CONDER AND 
HANSEN 
510 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
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